Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

How Digital Nudges Affect Consideration Set Size and Perceived Cognitive
Effort in Idea Convergence of Open Innovation Contests
Ivan Boskovic-Pavkovic
Convergent Media Group,
Croatia
iv8boskovic@gmail.com

Isabella Seeber
University of Innsbruck,
Austria
isabella.seeber@uibk.ac.at

Abstract
Open innovation initiatives are useful to acquire
many ideas, but often face problems when it comes to
selecting the best ideas. Idea convergence has been
suggested as a first step in idea selection to filter those
ideas that are worthy of further consideration. Digital
nudges – digital interventions that aim at altering
human behavior in a predictable way - could support
convergence. However, their effects are largely
unknown. This study explores how two digital nudges,
selection strategy (inclusion/exclusion) and idea subset
similarity (similar/random), affect the convergence
outcomes consideration set size and perceived cognitive
effort. We conducted a laboratory experiment with 88
students and found that guiding individuals towards an
inclusion strategy results in smaller consideration sets
and higher perceived cognitive effort. Moreover,
presenting individuals with subsets of similar ideas
resulted in smaller consideration sets. These insights
are relevant for the design and use of digital nudges for
convergence in open innovation environments.

1.

Introduction

Organizations increasingly employ crowds to
enhance their innovation processes, which has been
termed open innovation (OI) [1]. Innovation contests are
one form of OI initiatives, in which a crowd generates
hundreds or thousands of ideas from which only a few
will be selected as the best ideas [2]. Research has
established extensive insights and knowledge into the
idea creation process, but has not yet developed
sufficient understanding to explain the idiosyncrasies of
idea selection processes [3].
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During idea selection, a small team usually first
converges on the 10 to 40 most promising ideas within
a few days or weeks followed by a jury with high
domain expertise that determines the winning idea(s)
[4], [5]. Organizations struggle with adopting
appropriate convergence procedures when facing large
pools of generated ideas [5]. More and more
organizations attempt to outsource this process to the
crowd [2]. However, individual crowd raters are limited
in their ability to select the best ideas [3]. They
experience high levels of cognitive load [6] and are
influenced by cognitive biases [7], because of the often
number of ideas they need to process [4] and limited
knowledge of how the idea came about [3], [8].
Idea selection is not new, but developments in
technology provide new capabilities that continuously
alter the way how individuals make their choices [9].
For example, the innovation platform Hype1
incorporates amongst others a pairwise comparison
feature for ideas so that raters can more easily select
those ideas that perform well according to specific
quality criteria.
The design of meaningful features to support
convergence also sparked the interest of researchers
who investigated e.g., the design of adequate rating
scales [10], meaningful presentation modes of ideas [7]
or targeted digital facilitation intervention [11].
We propose that digital nudges, digital interventions
that alter “people’s behavior in a predictable way” [12],
could help raters to experience lower perceived
cognitive effort during convergence and achieve higher
reduction rates (smaller consideration set sizes). Digital
nudging aims at explaining how user-interface design
elements affect individual’s information processing and
choices [13]. It is crucial to identify influential digital
nudges that are able to alter human behavior to such
extent that they can significantly drive convergence
outcomes. While past research has identified a number

1

https://blog.hypeinnovation.com/product/pairwise-evaluationinnovation-platform-hype-enterprise

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59879
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Page 4415

of digital nudges, we still lack conceptual understanding
of how those digital nudges affect behavior and
outcomes [13], specifically in the application domain of
idea selection as part of open innovation initiatives.
This paper aims at addressing this gap, by
investigating the effects of two digital nudges on
convergence outcomes. We draw on an online
laboratory experiment involving 88 participants to
empirically test the effects of selection strategy and idea
similarity on consideration set size and perceived
cognitive effort.
2.

Background

2.1. Digital nudging
Nudges describe small objects placed into an
environment to steer people in particular directions.
This could be the placement of nutritious food into the
middle of a food court or having a painted fly on a men’s
urinal [14]. They are interventions into human behavior
and are more than the mere provision of factual
information or rational persuasion [12]. Hansen defines
a nudge as [12]:
“a function of (I) any attempt at influencing people’s
judgment, choice or behavior in a predictable way, that
is (1) made possible because of cognitive boundaries,
biases, routines and habits in individual and social
decision-making posing barriers for people to perform
rationally in their own declared self-interests, and
which (2) works by making use of those boundaries,
biases, routines, and habits as integral parts of such
attempts.”
Multiple types of nudges have been identified, such
as default rules, active choosing, increase in ease and
convenience, simplification, warnings, or reminders and
their effects have been studied in domains such as policy
making [15]. Recently, also the term digital nudge
emerged to describe nudges in the form of user-interface
design elements that exist in online choice environments
[13], in our case an idea convergence platform. These
design elements alter information processing in order to
affect our judgments and choices [16].
2.2. Dual processing and convergence outcomes
Dual processing theory suggests that there are two
systems at work when humans judge and engage in
decision-making [17].
System 1 processing is unconscious, implicit,
automatic, requires low effort, and is rapid [18]. In
contrast, system 2 processing is conscious, explicit,

controlled requires high effort and is slow [18], but
should lead to highly accurate choices [19]. System 1
processing is prone to cognitive biases, which may
result in imperfect decisions [17], [20]. Such biases are
systematic errors in our decision making [20] and might
therefore be detrimental to successful idea convergence.
Decision makers might not process all ideas in depth to
come to an informed decision and hence are more likely
to miss good ideas.
Consequently, perceived cognitive effort might be a
promising convergence outcome to be investigated,
because it indicates to what extent decision makers
engaged in effortful thinking. In addition, the success of
overall idea selection might depend on adequate
consideration set sizes after convergence. If
consideration sets are too large, more resources, i.e.
experts’ time, are required to make a final selection and
experts might be overloaded thus hampering the
decision outcome. If consideration sets are too small, the
variety of ideas might appear too small and thus affect
experts’ confidence in making an informed decision to
determine the winner idea(s). This suggests that
successful convergence should also consider
consideration set size as an indicator of performance.
3.

Hypotheses

3.1. Selection strategy
Prompting raters towards eliminating bad ideas
(lemons) showed to achieve higher evaluation accuracy
than prompting them towards selecting good ideas
(stars) [21]. The task prompt to choose good ideas or
eliminate bad ideas can be connected to theory on
inclusion and exclusion strategies [22], [23]. With
inclusion, a decision maker decides whether an “option
should be seriously considered for a final choice” [22,
p. 1194]. With exclusion, the decision maker decides
whether an “option should be dropped from further
consideration” [22, p. 1194].
Independent of the task type, decision makers that
adopt an exclusion strategy are likely to end up with
larger consideration set sizes [22], [23]. Rietzschel et al.
[24] confirmed that the hypothesis of larger
consideration set sizes for exclusion also holds true for
the selection of creative ideas. In their experiment,
participants self-generated the ideas that they later
converged on. It remains empirically unexplored, if
theory of larger consideration set sizes under exclusion
holds when decision makers converge on ideas that are
not their own as is the case for idea convergence in open
innovation initiatives.
In addition, information-processing behavior differs
for individuals that follow an inclusion compared to an
exclusion strategy. Past research showed that decision
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makers adopting an inclusion strategy examine more
attributes of an alternative (breadth) and spend more
time on an alternative (depth). This observation was
particularly pronounced for individuals with high need
for cognition [23]. In-depth processing might be even
higher when decision makers are prompted to select
ideas that are not their own, because they have limited
information about the idea [25]. Hence, the basic
mechanism behind such a digital nudge “selection
strategy” is to alter the depth and breadth of information
processing of alternatives and their attributes.
In an online environment, a task prompt in
connection with a check box or toggle switch provides
the necessary means to nudge decision makers either
into including or excluding ideas. This is a nudge of type
active choosing [15], which lets decision makers make
a conscious decision. This means in any case, the
decision maker needs to act to choose an idea (inclusion
condition) or drop an idea (exclusion condition). Thus,
H1: Decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by
inclusion will have a smaller consideration set than
decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by exclusion.
H2: Decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by
inclusion will have higher perceived cognitive effort
than decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by
exclusion.
3.2. Idea subset similarity
Many idea selection initiatives struggle with a high
number of similar and duplicate ideas submitted to a
contest [26]. The extent of idea similarity can provide
indication about the quality of an idea but research
findings are heterogeneous whether similarity of ideas
is a good or bad indicator of idea quality e.g., [27]–[29].
Even more under-researched is our understanding of
how similarity among ideas affects the decision making
processes. Field research indicates that categorizing
ideas makes the reduction of ideas easier [5]. A reason
for this provides extant literature in consumer research,
which showed that a lack of categorization may
contribute to choice overload [30]. Choice overload sets
in when a decision maker is faced with a complex
decision, which exceeds his or her individual cognitive
resources [31]. Hence, when being confronted with
uncategorized alternatives, decision makers find it
harder to navigate the choice set [30] because the
extracted features are not comparable. When similar
alternatives are presented and therefore overlaps in the
alternatives’ features exist [32] the choice should
become easier. The digital nudge “idea subset
similarity” is of type increase in ease and convenience,
which is implemented as a similarity feature (see

Section 4) and aims at reducing perceived difficulty
[15].
The basic mechanism behind this nudge is that it
makes it easier to compare features of alternatives when
similar ideas are presented and can be analyzed at once.
When features of alternatives are not aligned (dissimilar
idea sets), decision makers show higher search costs
[33], which might indicate higher perceived cognitive
effort. When the demand on perceived cognitive effort
increases to such an extent that decision makers
experience choice overload, they should be less likely to
make a choice at all (choice deferral) [34]. When
applying this line of argument to the context of idea
convergence, this suggests that choosing from a set of
dissimilar ideas should result in larger consideration set
sizes, because decision makers would defer their
choices and more perceived cognitive effort is required
due to increased search cost. In case of choosing from
similar ideas, decision makers should end up with
smaller consideration set sizes and experience lower
perceived cognitive effort, because it is easier for them
to compare the features inherent to the ideas and make a
choice. Thus,
H3: Decision makers presented with subsets defined
by idea similarity will have a smaller consideration set
than decision makers presented with random subsets.
H4: Decision makers presented with subsets defined
by idea similarity will perceive lower perceived
cognitive effort than decision makers presented with
random subsets.
4.

Method

We conducted a 2x2 between-subjects laboratory
experiment to explore the associations between our two
manipulated convergence mechanisms selection
strategy and idea similarity and the two dependent
variables consideration set size and perceived cognitive
effort. In the following, we describe the experimental
design and the methods we used to analyze the data
collected.
4.1. Manipulation
We implemented the two digital nudges (1) selection
strategy with the two options of inclusion and exclusion
(active choosing) and (2) idea similarity with the two
options similarity-based and random decomposition of
ideas into subsets (increase in ease and convenience) in
an online convergence platform using HTML5, AJAX,
jQuery, Javascript, mySQL and PHP. This system
allowed us to present participants with four treatments
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and to collect data on their choices, demographic data
and participants’ perceptions on the decision process
and outcome.
Selection strategy. The system provides the
participants with a task explanation that states that they
can either “choose” or “drop” ideas. The task prompt
conveyed that experts will consider the lists of ideas
selected by participants. This aimed at framing the
experimental task as idea convergence and not winner
determination. Furthermore, the ideas have a checkbox
next to them which, when selected, displays either the
“ü” symbol for the decision making variable “choose”
(Figure 1) or the symbol “û” for the “drop” variable
(Figure 2). Hence, in the inclusion treatment subjects
had to actively choose the “ü” box, whereas subjects in
the exclusion treatment had to actively choose the “û”
box. We refrained from using red and green colors to not
adversely affect subjects that are red-green colorblind.

Figure 1: Selection strategy: inclusion

Figure 2: Selection strategy: exclusion
Idea subset similarity. Our platform divides the
initial set of generated ideas into subsets of five ideas
that are considered in separate rounds. This division into
2

subsets of five ideas, which represents a small choice set
[34], was held constant for all treatments. This should
facilitate idea convergence as it helps guide the attention
to a few ideas at a time [11]. Still, given the context of
the study, individuals are likely to experience cognitive
overload even with small choice sets because the
decision task is difficult, individual’s preference is
uncertain, and the overall choice set is complex [34]. We
implemented the digital nudge “idea subset similarity”
so that the platform presents either random or similaritybased subsets of ideas, but no further indication, e.g.,
category description, was provided.
For random decomposition of idea subsets, our
convergence platform calls a subset of five ideas out of
the total set of 75 ideas from a MySQL database system
at a time with a simple random function that the
database management system offers. The system repeats
this drawing of five ideas until all ideas from the initial
idea pool have been shown to participants exactly once.
For decomposition of similar idea subsets, the
platform selects the five most similar ideas out of the
idea pool, removes them from the pool and repeats the
drawing until all ideas are presented exactly once. We
measure the similarity of ideas with an algorithm that
determines and weighs similarity between ideas. While
generally there is a plethora of text analysis techniques,
many focus on comparing two long text fragments or a
short to a long one [35], [36]. As our idea pool contains
short sentences, it is difficult to apply those machine
learning algorithms to determine similarity. Therefore,
we devised a custom algorithm.
The algorithm first performs some text
preprocessing, i.e. removal of stop words. The algorithm
then acquires the synonyms of all remaining words from
the WordNet ontology database2 that offers English
nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs grouped into sets
of cognitive synonyms and interlinked by means of
conceptual-semantic and lexical relations, resulting in a
network of meaningfully related words and concepts.
We employ the WordNet API to get the synonyms for
each word of an idea using a threshold of 30 for the
semantic distance calculated by WordNet, as this
threshold marks a noticeable decrease in the similarity
between the original word and synonyms beyond this
distance. Every idea is therefore enriched by its
synonyms.
The algorithm selects an enriched idea as reference
idea and compares it to every other idea in the set, thus
calculating a similarity metric of the number of matched
words between two ideas, both original words and
synonyms. The algorithm creates a subset of the
reference idea plus the four ideas with the highest values
on this similarity metric and records the subset’s total

https://wordnet.princeton.edu
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similarity score. The algorithm then removes these five
ideas from the idea pool and repeats this drawing
process until all ideas have been shown to participants
exactly once.
We found this algorithm to yield the highest total
similarity score (2,737 matches of words) out of a series
of options we experimented with.
4.2. Subjects
We recruited 93 bachelor students from the
introductory course to Information Systems at a
European university. We deem students as appropriate
representatives of crowd workers, who are
predominantly young, hold a bachelor’s degree and
have a rather low income [37]. Their participation was
voluntary and they received course credit for their
participation. While the experiment was in English, the
course language was German. Due to the fact that
English proficiency is high throughout the university
and no problems related to language were raised during
or after the experiment, we do not expect that there
existed a language barrier that could have affected the
results of the experiment. The participants’ average age
was 21.5 years.
4.3. Measures
We measured the two dependent variables
consideration set size plus perceived cognitive effort
and controlled for gender, domain expertise, and need
for cognition.
Consideration set size describes the number of
ideas retained after the convergence task [24]. For
subjects in the inclusion treatment, we counted the
number of ideas they selected into their consideration
set. For subjects in the exclusion treatment, we counted
the number of ideas they did not exclude and therefore
remained in their consideration set.
Perceived cognitive effort refers to the degree of
engagement with a demanding task [38]. We adopted
three items [39], [40] and adapted the items to
correspond to the study’s context: “The task of selecting
ideas took too much time”, “Selecting ideas required too
much effort”, and “Selecting ideas was too complex”.
Controls. We controlled for gender, domain
expertise, and need for cognition. Gender was part of the
demographic data we collected and found to be strongly
correlated with consideration set size and hence taken
up as control in our further data analysis. Domain
expertise and need for cognition were included, because
they have been identified as relevant factors for choice

overload [34] and therefore the perception of cognitive
effort. We self-developed the construct of domain
expertise by formulating the five items: “I have
expertise in the topic of emergency response.”, “I have
experience with emergency response.”, “I am very
competent in the topic of emergency response.”, “I am
not familiar with the topic of emergency response. (r)”,
and “Emergency response interests me.” We adopted
five items from [41] to measure need for cognition. The
scale assesses to what extent individuals engage and
enjoy thinking with the items “I don’t like to have to do
a lot of thinking.(r)”, “I try to avoid situations that
require thinking in-depth about something.(r)”, “I prefer
complex problems over simple problems.”, “I prefer to
do something that challenges my thinking abilities
rather than something that requires little thought.”, and
“Thinking hard and for a long time about something
gives me little satisfaction. (r)”.
4.4. Procedure and task
The experiment consisted of the three phases (1) task
description and consent, (2) convergence task and (3)
post-task survey.
Students were (1) informed about our experiment
and that participation is voluntary, anonymous and
incentivized by course credit. They signed a consent
form if they volunteered to participate. We also
informed participants that there is no time limit for
completing the experiment and that one of the authors
was available to answer any questions they might have
or help with technical difficulties that they might
experience.
Concerning the (2) convergence task, emails with a
link to the web page which hosted the convergence
platform were sent before class to each student taking
the course. We randomly assigned students into one of
four treatment groups resulting from a 2x2 factorial
design. In each treatment group, participants were
tasked to converge on a total of 75 ideas, decomposed
into 15 subsets of five ideas presented per page. The
ideas suggested help measures to tackle the problems of
a fictional town “Norvos” getting hit by extreme
flooding which was based on real events. The ideas had
been generated in a previous crowdsourcing initiative.
Our participants’ task was, based on their treatment
group, to choose (drop) the help measures that they
deemed relevant and useful (neither relevant, nor useful)
and that should (should not) be further considered by a
team of emergency response experts. Participants were
informed that they could select any number of ideas
between zero and five per page.
We finally asked participants to complete a (3) posttask survey with which we collected data on perceived

Page 4419

cognitive effort, need for cognition, domain expertise,
and demographics.
5.

Results

Manipulation check and outliers. To check whether
a subject correctly perceived the selection strategy, we
included the item “What decision making choice were
you presented with? [choose idea or drop idea]. We had
to exclude four subjects who were tasked to drop ideas
but answered that their task was to choose ideas. To check
if subjects correctly perceived idea set similarity, we
included the item “To what extent did you perceive ideas
in sets of 5 to be similar?” and measured it on a 5-point
Likert scale. We performed an ANOVA to assess whether
subjects perceived the idea sets in the similarity treatment
as more similar than in the random treatment. Results
indicate a non-significant effect (F(1, 86)=0.049, p >
0.05). Our participants perceived the ideas as somewhat
similar in both the similarity treatment (M=2.10;
SD=0.69) and the random treatment (M=2.07; SD=0.57).
Moreover, we dismissed data of one student as an outlier,
because he finished the task within 59 seconds, whereas
the average time spent in his treatment group was 13:08
minutes. Across all treatment groups participants needed
13:54 minutes on average to complete the experiment.
The final dataset contained 88 subjects of which were 44
female and 44 male students, which were unequally
distributed between treatments (Table 1).
Reliability and validity. We performed reliability
analysis and exploratory factor analysis for domain
expertise, perceived need for cognition and cognitive
effort in an iterative manner to establish reliability and
validity of our perceptual constructs. Cronbach’s
Alphas for perceived cognitive effort and need for
cognition was below the recommended threshold of 0.7
[42]. Reliability of perceived cognitive effort could have
been improved by dropping the third item, but we
decided against that in order to follow the
recommendation to measure perceptual constructs with
at least three items [43]. Also the Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA with Promax rotation) revealed in our
first attempt a four-factor instead of a three-factor
solution. Two items of need for cognition and one item
for domain knowledge loaded poorly on their latent
factor. Therefore, we dropped those items and repeated
reliability and validity analyses. After revision, we
deemed Cronbach’s Alphas acceptable for perceived
cognitive effort (α = 0.656), need for cognition (α =
0.680), and domain knowledge (α = 0.921). Also
convergent validity was deemed satisfactory with factor
loadings > 0.5 and Measures of Sampling Adequacy
(MSA) > 0.5. Also discriminant validity was deemed

satisfactory as the pattern matrix suggested a threefactor solution [43]. We then used an averaged scale for
domain expertise and created a binary variable for need
for cognition using median split to interpret low and
high need for cognition individuals.
Controls. We ran ANOVAs on gender, domain
expertise, and need for cognition. There were no
significant differences between treatments for each of
the control variables (Fgender=1.028, Fdomain_expertise =
0.185, Fneed_for_cognition = 1.920).
Tests of assumptions for MANCOVA. We added
gender, domain expertise, and need for cognition as covariates and performed a MANCOVA specifying
selection strategy (choose, drop) and idea similarity
(similar, random) as independent variables and
consideration set size and perceived cognitive effort as
dependent variables. The descriptive statistics are given
in Table 1. Concerning the assumption of equality of
variance-covariance matrices, we assessed the Box’s M
test using the recommended conservative significance
level of 0.01 [43]. The test statistic indicates that there
exist no significant differences between treatment
groups (p > 0.01) and therefore the assumption is not
violated. Concerning the assumption of multivariate
normal distribution, which cannot be directly tested in
SPSS, we fell back to the common procedure to assess
normal distribution for each dependent variable per
treatment group with the Shapiro-Wilk test [43]. All
normality tests showed insignificant values (p > 0.05)
indicating that the data does not significantly deviate
from a normal distribution. We also drew on
scatterplots, which visually supported this statistical
result.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of treatment groups
Choose Choose Drop / Drop /
/
/
random similar
random similar
# of
20
25
22
21
subjects
# of
39.25
33.80
62.14
59.76
selected
(9.13)
(10.53)
(5.00)
(7.18)
ideas
Perceived
3.63
3.43
3.12
3.11
cognitive
(0.59)
(0.61)
(0.85)
(0.64)
effort
Gender
Domain
expertise
Need for
cognition

10 m /
10 f
4.03
(0.80)
1.98
(0.68)

9m/
16 f
4.09
(1.01)
1.87
(0.65)

13 m /
9f
4.18
(0.91)
2.33
(0.67)

12 m /
9f
3.98
(1.08)
2.08
(0.74)
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Hypotheses testing. The multivariate test statistic
shows a significant main effect for selection strategy
(Pillai’s trace = 0.735, F (2, 80) = 111.168, p < 0.001),
idea similarity (Pillai’s trace = 0.079, F (2, 80) = 3.427, p
= 0.037), gender (Pillai’s trace = 0.095, F(2, 80) = 4.215,
p = 0.018), and need for cognition (Pillai’s trace = 0.097,
F ( 2, 80) = 4.308, p = 0.017). There was no significant
main effect for the covariate domain expertise (Pillai’s
trace = 0.050, F(2, 80) = 2.119, p > 0.05). There was also
no significant multivariate interaction effect (Pillai’s trace
= 0.009, F(2, 80) = 0.688, p > 0.05). Hypotheses testing
proceeded with interpreting the univariate test statistics,
which are summarized in Table 2.
H1 suggested that consideration sets would be
smaller and H2 suggested that perceived cognitive effort
would be higher for decision makers who chose ideas
(inclusion) than for decision makers who dropped ideas
(exclusion). The univariate test statistics show
significant differences for consideration set size (F (1,
81) = 208.825, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.721) and
perceived cognitive effort (F (1, 81) = 5.268, p = 0.024,
partial η2 = 0.061). Decision makers who chose ideas
had on average 36.22 out of 75 ideas in their
consideration sets in contrast to 60.98 out of 75 ideas for
decision makers who dropped ideas. Hence, directing
decision makers towards choosing ideas resulted in
smaller consideration sets, which supports H1.
Moreover, decision makers perceived on average higher
cognitive effort when choosing ideas (M = 3.52) than
when dropping ideas (M = 3.12). Therefore, also H2 is
supported.
H3 and H4 were concerned with the effects of idea
similarity and suggested that consideration sets would
be smaller and perceived cognitive effort would be
lower for decision makers who select from similar ideas

in subsets compared to decision makers who select from
random ideas. The univariate test statistics show
significant differences for consideration set size (F (1,
81) = 6.146, p = 0.015, partial η2 = 0.071) but not for
perceived cognitive effort (F (1, 81) = 1.389, p > 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.017). Decision makers who chose or
dropped ideas from subsets with similar ideas had on
average 45.65 out of 75 ideas in their final consideration
sets compared to 51.24 out of 75 ideas for decision
makers presented with subsets of randomly allocated
ideas. Hence, H3 is supported. Moreover, the cognitive
effort was perceived lower in the similarity treatment
(M = 3.28) than in the random treatment (M = 3.37).
This direction was as expected, but the difference was
not significant and therefore H4 is not supported.
Controls
We further investigated the significant multivariate
main effects of the control variables (see Table 2).
There exists a significant univariate main effect of
gender on consideration set size (F(1, 81) = 8.604, p =
0.004). Men selected more ideas (M=52.61, SD=12.75)
than women (M=44.02, SD=16.03). There was no
significant main effect of gender on perceived cognitive
effort (F(1, 81) = 0.000, p > 0.05).
We found a significant univariate main effect for
need for cognition on consideration set size (F(1, 81) =
5.978, p = 0.017). Yet, further bi-variate correlation
analysis revealed no significant direct association
between need for cognition and consideration set size.
We also found a significant univariate main effect for
perceived need for cognition on cognitive effort (F(1,
81) = 6.066, p = 0.016). Individuals with low need for
cognition perceived the task to be more cognitively
effortful (M= 3.58, SD = 0.71) than individuals with
high need for cognition (M = 3.14, SD = 0.64).

Table 2: Results of hypotheses tests
Source
Selection strategy
Idea similarity
Gender
Domain expertise
Need for cognition
Error
Selection strategy
Idea similarity
Gender
Domain expertise
Need for cognition
Error

DF

Mean
F
p-value
square
ANOVA Dependent variable: Consideration set size
1
12004.933
208.825
0.000
1
353.318
6.146
0.015
1
494.609
8.604
0.004
1
230.633
4.012
0.049
1
343.691
5.978
0.017
81
57.488
ANOVA Dependent variable: Perceived cognitive effort
1
2.310
5.268
0.024
1
0.609
1.389
0.242
1
0.000
0.000
0.997
1
0.255
0.581
0.448
1
2.660
6.066
0.016
81
0.438

Partial ƞ2
0.721
0.071
0.096
0.047
0.069
0.061
0.017
0.000
0.255
2.660
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6.

Implications, Limitations and Future Research

This research set out to investigate which digital
nudges can achieve improved convergence outcomes in
open innovation initiatives. We tested the digital nudges
“selection strategy” and “idea subset similarity” and
found that “selection strategy” is significantly
associated with consideration set size and perceived
cognitive effort while “idea subset similarity” is also
significantly associated with consideration set size but
only weakly significantly associated with perceived
cognitive effort.
Theoretical implications. We provide empirical
evidence that the digital nudge of “selection strategy”
successfully prompted individuals towards either
including (choose) promising or excluding (drop) nonpromising ideas. Our findings show that individuals
prompted with an inclusion strategy form smaller
consideration sets than under an exclusion strategy. This
confirms the effects of inclusion/exclusion on
consideration set size in a setting of convergence with
crowd-generated ideas.
In addition, individuals prompted with inclusion
also showed higher perceived cognitive effort. This
finding suggests that in the inclusion treatment
participants adapted decision strategies that process
alternatives in depth and hence require more cognitive
resources. Hence, our findings contribute an additional
relationship between inclusion/exclusion strategies and
perceived cognitive effort to theory.
Moreover, this study provides empirical evidence
that there exists a relationship between the digital nudge
“idea subset similarity” and consideration set size. Our
findings show that decision makers created significantly
smaller consideration sets when the convergence system
presented them with subsets defined by idea similarity.
To our surprise, we did not find empirical evidence that
“idea subset similarity” was significantly associated
with perceived cognitive effort. The direction of our
theorizing is supported but the difference was not
significant on the 0.05 level. A reason could be that the
subset size of five as an intervention already sufficiently
decreased cognitive effort to curb choice deferral [44].
Hence, our findings add a new hypothesis to the body of
literature on selection that consideration set sizes are
smaller when people can choose from choice sets that
include similar alternatives rather than from randomly
arranged choice sets.
Practical implications. Our findings have also
implications for managers and designers. Managers of

open innovation initiatives can benefit from our findings
in two ways. First, if their concern is to drastically
reduce a huge number of ideas into a shortlist, they
should prompt their raters towards an inclusion strategy
and present them with subsets of similar ideas.
However, the inclusion strategy might demand quite
substantial perceived cognitive effort from the raters.
Second, if the concern is to reduce perceived cognitive
effort, they should prompt their raters towards
exclusion. However, in this case managers need to
anticipate larger consideration sets. This is an
interesting trade-off. Either opt for larger consideration
sets and lower perceived cognitive effort or smaller
consideration sets and higher perceived cognitive
efforts. It suggests that managers should get to know
their crowd workers whether they enjoy effortful
thinking tasks or not. If this is the case, managers can
achieve the best convergence outcomes by adopting the
“idea strategy” digital nudge of exclusion.
Limitations. There also exist some limitations that
need to be considered when drawing on our findings.
Our idea similarity manipulation needs to be interpreted
carefully because subjects did not perceive subsets as
significantly more similar in this treatment condition
than in the random condition. This perception might
have been influenced by the decreasing level of
similarity among ideas the further decision makers
proceeded in the assessment. Such decreasing similarity
is a function of the algorithm we employed for
decomposition of ideas into subsets.
Moreover, we drew on a small student population
to mimic a crowd of non-experts. It could be that the
effects of idea similarity change once the assessment is
performed by individuals with high domain expertise.
Further data collection is necessary to increase sample
size.
Future research. The reported research discovered
novel relevant relationships between digital nudges and
convergence outcomes. The underlying behavioral and
cognitive
mechanisms,
which
explain
these
relationships were theorized but not tested. Hence,
future research should dig deeper into the discovered
relationships and set out to find empirical evidence that
supports (or fails to support) these relationships.
While this study compares inclusion to exclusion
strategies in convergence of crowd-generated ideas,
future research could investigate how effects change
when the digital nudge “selection strategy” is less
restrictive and allows to choose and drop ideas at the
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same time or to apply a sequence of inclusion and
exclusion in a multi-stage convergence process.
Future research could also investigate if the digital
nudge idea subset similarity is more influential at the
beginning or the end of a decision making process.
Future research could assess the effectiveness of this
nudge of idea similarity by comparing the results of the
first rounds where the perception of similarity among
ideas was likely to be high with later rounds of less
similar ideas. Moreover, it would be interesting to find
out if the effectiveness of idea subset similarity depends
on sizes of subsets. While our algorithm used a fixed
subset size of five ideas, future research might explore
the effects of an endogenous definition of subset size
based on ideas similarity or compare small versus large
subsets.
In this study, participants had to decide on the most
promising ideas from 75 ideas. While the number of
ideas presented appears to be big, each of the ideas were
described in one sentence. It is likely that perceived
cognitive effort would increase considerably with an
increase of text length and potentially more inherent
features. Hence, future research could replicate this
study but switch to ideas with longer descriptions.
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